ABSTRACT Powerful smart terminals with rich set of embedded sensors promote the development of the Internet of Things (IoTs). Mobile crowdsensing systems (MCSs) can be formed by these mobile smart terminals from IoTs to collect and exchange data. The main idea of MCSs is to outsource sensing tasks (collecting data) to various mobile devices which are carried by people or vehicles. The design of incentive mechanisms in MCSs is one of the hottest current research topics. However, most of the existing studies focus on maximizing the utilities or social welfare while neglecting the practical requirements of MCSs surveillance applications. In this paper, we discuss the importance of fairness and unconsciousness of MCS surveillance applications. Then, we propose offline and online incentive mechanisms with fair task scheduling based on the proportional share allocation rules. Furthermore, to have more sensing tasks done over time dimension, we relax the truthfulness and unconsciousness property requirements and design a (ε, µ)-unconsciousness online incentive mechanism. Real map data are used to validate these proposed incentive mechanisms through extensive simulations.
I. INTRODUCTION
The highly distributed paradigm Internet of Thing (IoT) extends ubiquity of the Internet through integrating every terminal for interaction via embedded systems, in which all the physical terminals can collect and exchange data [1] - [5] . IoT will be the fast-growing, largest market potential and the most attractive emerging economy according to the Top 10 Predictions of 2014 by Gartner [6] . In IoT, the new emerging techniques integrate multiple types of sensors and high-performance processors into physical terminals, e.g., smartphones (iPhones, Sumsung Galaxy, etc.), tablets (iPad, etc.), and vehicle-embedded sensing terminals (GPS). These mobile terminals can be used to sense and collect data, so that become data sources. All above mentioned properties make IoT a perfect choice for the Mobile Crowdsening System (MCS). In an MCS, a complicated sensing job is divided into several simpler tasks. Each participated mobile physical terminal can undertake one or more simpler sensing tasks. The most attractive properties of MCSs is that it aims at letting the regular mobile physical terminals work for the complicated job, while keeping the users of these mobile physical terminals unconscious. In tradition, however, the job must be done by professional experts and the sensors have to be deployed in advance.
The MCSs have already been applied to our daily life. One of the best examples is the smart city project discussed in [7] . It can be used to collect information around the city and then contributes to the intelligent operation of public services. In detail, it tracks public vehicles and map bumps on the road for the urban transportation systems in a city. The Microblogs presented in [8] , provides a mechanism where mobile physical terminals can share their information (like travel, restaurants, and news) through a universal platform. Then, the center server in the platform processes and analyzes the shared data and provides an alternative solution for problems or helps to make decisions. MCSs can also be used in surveillance applications, such as monitoring pollution levels or traffic, measuring water levels, and collecting wildlife habitats. Practical surveillance applications include Common Sense and CreekWatch which can be found in [9] and [10] , respectively.
However, users of these mobile physical terminals participating in an MCS will suffer from extra resource consumption (battery and computing capacities) and the risk of privacy exposure (location exposure). So effective and efficient incentive mechanisms are needed in MCSs to attract enough mobile physical terminals' participation. A common strategy designed in MCSs is to give rewards to participated users as compensation and stimulation. Lots of works can be found on incentive mechanisms and most of them are based on game theory [11] , [12] . We classify the existing works into two categories: the offline incentive mechanisms and the online incentive mechanisms. The former will collect the information of all participants before making the decision, while the latter decides whether to accept a new arriving participant sequentially without the information of next following participants. After analyzing these existing works, we find they are not appropriate to surveillance applications for the following reasons: i) the tasks allocation algorithms are unfair over the time dimension. Most of the surveillance applications require continuous sensing information for a period of time. Taking the noise level monitoring application as an example, if a cloud center wants to surveil the noise level of a place, it expects to get noise data of the place for a period of time. Generally speaking, more than one mobile physical terminal will participate in the sensing task. It is better to evenly schedule sensing tasks among a set of mobile physical terminals over the particular period of time. However, mechanisms proposed in existing works [9] , [13] may lead to the situation that several mobile physical objects are assigned to sense the noise at the same time incidentally. ii) existing mechanisms require deep interaction between participated users and their mobile physical terminals. That is, sometimes participated users are required to pay lots of attention to their devices or forced to change their own schedule when working for the MCS. For example, the working schedules of users are decided by the MCS in [14] . The significant advantage of MCSs over Wireless Senor Networks (WSNs) is that we don't need to deploy the sensors or workers in advance. However, the required deep interaction will interfere participants' original plan which should be avoided. The incentive mechanisms investigated in this work try to overcome the two weaknesses.
We consider an MCS on surveillance applications from both the time and space dimensions. Each sensing task published by the MCS is tagged with a location requirement and a period of time requirement. Once being published, the sensing task is required to be done multiple times over the time period at the specific location. For fairness over the time dimension, a time period is divided into smaller time slots and the sensing task will be processed periodically over these time slots. The participants of the MCS are the mobile vehicles with sensors installed and are able to work for sensing tasks. The device on the vehicle will communicate with cloud servers by 3G or LTE techniques. The drivers of these vehicles are general office workers commuting between home and office. Their routes are relatively stable and they will let the servers know their routes in advance. When a vehicle passes through a location where a sensing task is required, the sensors can work for the sensing task automatically. The objective of the MCS is to select a set of qualified vehicles with devices so that as many tasks can be done evenly over time.
In this paper, we first design an offline incentive mechanism where the proportional share allocation rule is applied. Then we consider the realistic situations and propose online auction mechanisms where each winner vehicle will be decided relying on the information of the vehicle itself and the vehicles arriving before it. The contributions of this paper are as follows:
• We first discuss and investigate the importance of unconsciousness in MCSs and get the conclusion that the frequencies of interaction between participants and cloud center should be minimized.
• We introduce the MCS model on surveillance applications. After that, the design of incentive mechanisms under the offline and online cases are designed. The task allocation algorithms are implemented fairly considering practical property requirements.
• In order to improve the performance of the online incentive mechanism, we relax the truthfulness and unconsciousness requirements and propose a (ε, µ)-unconsciousness online incentive mechanism. In the rest of the paper, we present and discuss previous works in section II. Then the MCS system model and problem are formulated in section III. Incentive mechanisms for the offline and online cases are introduced in section IV and section V, respectively. We evaluate the performance of these proposed incentive mechanisms in section VI and conclude the paper in section VII.
II. RELATED WORKS
In this section, existing literature related to our research are summarized. We first present the existing research on commercial MCS applications. After that, the advantages and disadvantages of existing research on incentive mechanisms in MCSs are discussed. Finally, existing online incentive mechanisms in MCSs are presented.
Commercial MCS applications can be divided into three categories [15] . The first category is environmental applications, where participants undertake tasks for environmental monitoring, such as pollution level measuring, noise level monitoring and wildlife habitats surveillance. Example applications include Common Sense [9] and CreekWatch [10] . The second category focuses on infrastructures. Applications in this category collect information from participated users and then use the information to help the decision making on improving public services (like parking availability and traffic conditions). For example, Smart Cities introduced in [7] track the urban environment and use the collected information to help improve the quality of life in or around cities. CarTel and Nericell, presented in [16] and [17] respectively, are also infrastructure applications. The last category contains social applications where participants can sense their own data and share them through social networks. A few representative works can be found in DietSense [18] and BikeNet [19] . All these applications mentioned above demonstrate the great potential of MCSs. Now, many researchers focus on incentive mechanisms design in MCSs and most of which are based on game theory [20] - [23] . Two types of incentive mechanisms are considered in [24] : the platform-centric incentive mechanism and the user-centric incentive mechanism. The former is based on Stackelberg game where the platform controls the total budget distribution, and users adjust their strategies to satisfy the requirements requested by the platform. In the latter, users bid with a price for the services they provided to the platform. But [24] only considers the offline case. Cheung et al. [25] focus on the problem of distributed time-sensitive and location-dependent task selection. The problem is formulated as a non-cooperative task selection game (TSG). A distributed solution is proposed based on the potential function [26] in game theory. However, the work scheduling algorithm proposed in [25] only considers the utility of each user. So working for sensing tasks may disturb the normal lives of participants. As we discussed in the last section, an attractive incentive mechanism should keep its influence on participants' normal life as low as possible.
Literature [14] , [27] , [28] study the design of online incentive mechanisms design. Reference [27] investigates the online task assignment problem and provide a two-phase exploration-exploitation assignment algorithm. Ho et al. [28] formulate the task assignment and label inference problems for heterogeneous classification tasks. They adopt online primal-dual techniques to design the probably near-optimal adaptive assignment algorithm. But [27] and [28] omit discussing the reward for participants. Reference [14] focuses on the online incentive mechanism design and proposed OMZ for the zero arrival-departure interval case and OMG for the general case. However, the task allocation discussed in this paper does not consider the time-dimension. There is a potential that a task is allocated to several users but these users process the task at the same time. That will bring waste of resources in MCS surveillance applications.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION A. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Considering a Mobile Crowdsensing System (MCS) (as shown in Fig. 1 ) which is able to undertake sensing tasks such like traffic surveillance and environmental pollution monitoring. In the MCS, a Crowdsensing Platform (CP) publishes a set of sensing tasks = {τ 1 , τ 2 , . . . , τ m } (| | = m). Each sensing task τ ∈ is defined by a collection of features: where l τ ∈ L specifies the location of the sensing task and L represents the set of locations which are along routes. r τ represents the reward that the CP would like to pay if the sensing task τ is done. Each sensing task in is required to be sensed during time T . For simplicity, T is divided into multiple time slots T = {t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t |T | }. Let V = {v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n } be the set of Mobile Vehicles with Devices (MVDs). These mobile vehicles move on routes and will pass through one or more locations of sensing tasks. Corresponding sensing tasks will be performed by the devices installed on MVDs automatically. Given an MVD v ∈ V , its features can be denoted as
where ρ v is the route of v and is defined as discrete location-time points information
are used to represent v's starting and destination location-time points, respectively. Assume a vehicle would not visit a location more than once in T . An MVD is able to finish any sensing task if the MVD passes through the location of the sensing task. Let c v be the cost of v if v works for all the sensing tasks located in its route. γ v is v's driving speed which determines how many time slots are required for v to move between any two different sensing tasks.
All these surveillance sensing tasks (traffic surveillance or environmental pollution monitoring) require to be sensed multiple times in T. However, it is difficult to persuade an MVD to stay at a location without influencing its original routine. Alternatively, a sensing task could be sensed multiple times by different MVDs over different time slots. We call the number of times a sensing task required to be sensed as its space-time coverage requirement. To be fair, for each sensing task, its space-time coverage requirement is distributed over the time slots in T evenly. Matrix F = [f τ,t ] ∈ (0, 1) ×T is used to represent the space-time coverage requirements of all sensing tasks over the time dimension. For example, f τ,t = 1 represents that the sensing task τ needs to be sensed once in time slot t. Otherwise, f τ,t = 0. The objective of the CP is to choose winner MVDs, set W that can reach the best coverage requirements over all sensing tasks. The problem can be defined as,
where W is the winner MVDs. Matrix
∈ (0, 1) ×T represents the allocated working schedule for v. x v,τ,t = 1 indicates v is allocated to work for sensing task τ in time slot t, otherwise x v,τ,t = 0. The second constraint specifies that a sensing task should be allocated to no more than one MVD in a specific time slot.
B. REVERSE AUCTION MODEL DESIGN
Working for sensing tasks brings extra battery consumption, hardware loss and privacy threats to MVDs. Therefore, the winner MVDs expect to receive monetary rewards from the CP as stimulation and compensation. We apply reverse auction model to the interaction between the CP and MVDs, where the CP acts as the buyer and auctioneer at the same time. The roles of MVDs in the model are sellers. After the CP publishes the sensing tasks, each v ∈ V submits its bid, which can be denoted as, For each MVD v ∈ V in our model, S * = {(τ, t)|(τ, t) ∈ ρ v } is the set of sensing tasks can be done by v and S denotes the sensing tasks allocated to v by the CP when v wins in the auction. Therefore, once a winner v is allocated any set of sensing tasks which v is able to sense, its cost is a consent value. If the allocated sensing task set includes one or more sensing tasks which v can not sense, v will reject the allocation and the cost of v is set as infinity for clarity. Each v sets its bid according to the strategy aiming to maximize its own utility. U v is used to denote the utility of v and defined as:
Gen anism should satisfy several properties to guarantee its efficiency and effectiveness.
1) INDIVIDUAL RATIONALITY
Because all MVDs are self-interest to benefit themselves, the utility of any v ∈ V should be non-negative: U v ≥ 0.
2) TRUTHFULNESS
An auction mechanism is called truthful if all MVDs bid with their true value (real cost). The utility of v j will be maximized when it reports true values in its bid and v j cannot improve its utility through any misreport: If an auction mechanism satisfies this property, Nash Equilibrium exists. The misreports of first value (route) in a bid can be easily detected by the CP through the submitted results of their works. Thus the truthfulness of the first value is guaranteed. We focus on the truthfulness of the second value in a bid: asking price.
3) BUDGET BALANCE
The upper bound of the total payments for all the MVD winners is B= τ ∈ r τ , and we call B as the budget constraint of the CP. In other word, the auction mechanism should be budget balance: B ≥ v∈W p v .
4) UNCONSCIOUSNESS
Participation for the MCS are subordinate to MVDs' original target. In detail, the route of each MVD has been scheduled before the CP publishes the sensing tasks. An MVD will not change its route for the reward. On the other hand, when an MVD passes through the location of a sensing task, the sensors installed on the MVD should work automatically without requiring operation from the driver. We call this kind of participation as unconsciousness.
5) COMPUTATIONAL EFFICIENCY
An auction mechanism is considered computationally efficient if the task allocation and payment decision can be implemented in polynomial time. When the above properties are all satisfied, an auction mechanism can be considered as useful. Without individual rationality, an MVD may receive negative utility, and refuses to participate in the MCS. Then, because the c v in bid b v is private to v, the CP wouldn't know it. If an auction mechanism is truthful, all MVDs just need to bid with their true costs: A i = c i , which not only simplify the strategies, but also avoid possible manipulation from some MVDs. Budget balance make all winner MVDs get their deserved payments. Unconsciousness attracts more MVDs to participate in the MCS. Finally, computational efficiency will guarantee that the auction mechanism can be practically implemented. 
IV. OFFLINE AUCTION MECHANISM A. OFFLINE WORKING PROCESS OF MCSs
In this section, we first focus on the design of offline incentive mechanisms. The working process of an offline MCS can be divided into three stages: publishing stage, auction stage and working stage, as shown in Fig. 2 .
Publishing stage. In this stage, the CP decides the sensing tasks that it plans to finish within T . Then it publishes the description of these sensing tasks among the MVDs.
Auction stage. After receiving requirements of sensing tasks and their description, each MVD generates locationtime points sequence according to its original scheduled route. The sequence of location-time points implies the set of sensing tasks an MVD can take. If an MVD is able to work for a set of sensing task τ , it will further evaluate the cost caused by them. An MVD calculates its cost as the base price and submits a bid to the CP. The bid submitted by an MVD consists of its location-time points sequence and the base price. After receiving bids from all participating MVDs, the CP will choose a set of winner, make the work schedule, determine each winner's reward and then announce the auction result to all participated MVDs.
Working stage. According to the working schedules, each MVD winner will be activated by the CP while passing through a specific location at a specific time. The reward is given to an MVD once it finishes all allocated sensing tasks.
In this work, our focus is the design of efficient and effective incentive mechanisms during the auction stage. The other two stages are omitted.
B. MODIFIED PROPORTIONAL SHARE AUCTION MECHANISM
The design of an offline incentive mechanism for problem (1) is more complex than our past work [29] because the consideration of the budget balance property. We rewrite the problem function in (1) as a new form
} and find an interesting point: it is a nondecreasing submodular function.
Definition 2: A function h(·) is submodular if:
where is a finite set, ω ⊆ X ⊆ and v ∈ \X , and h(·) : 2 V → R + .
Theorem 1: The objective function g(W ) is a nondecreasing submodular function.
Proof: For any W ⊆ X ⊆ V and v ∈ V \X , there have
Then, it is easy to obtain a conclusion
Based on the above analysis, we apply the modified proportional share auction mechanism proposed in [30] , which is based on the proportional share allocation rule. The auction mechanism has two stages: winner set determination and payment decision.
Algorithm 1 Winner Set Determination
Input:
{W ; p v and x v , v ∈ W } 1: Initialization:
if l τ is same to l v and y τ,t v == 0 then 10: x v,τ,t v = 1, y τ,t v = 1.
11:
end if 12: end for 13 : end while
The winner set determination process is shown in algorithm 1, where g v (W ) denotes the marginal contribution of v to the coverage requirements, and is calculated as:
The winner set determination algorithm iteratively selects the MVD who has the largest marginal contribution to the coverage requirement until condition
Once the winner set is identified, payment of each winner v in W will be calculated as follows. Firstly, sort all v j ∈ W \v VOLUME 5, 2017 in the non-increasing sorting as,
where O j represents the set of first j MVDs in the sorting result (O 0 = ∅) and g −v
is the marginal contribution of v j when v is removed. Then find the MVD v ∈ W \v in the position z of the sorting result which satisfies
. The payment of v will be determined by,
where g
represents the marginal contribution of v at position j in the sorting result.
Theorem 2: The modified proportional share auction mechanism satisfies: individual rationality, truthfulness, Budget Balance, and computational efficiency [30] .
Theorem 3: Participation in the MCS are unconscious to all MVDs.
Proof: The working scheduling for each winner MVD is on its predefined route and the MVD will be triggered automatically, so theorem 3 is true. 
V. ONLINE REVERSE AUCTION MECHANISM A. ONLINE WORKING PROCESS OF MCSs
In this section, we try to solve the problem formulated in section III online. Compared with the offline interactions process in MCSs, the online interaction between the CP and MVDs are more flexible. The auction stage and working stage are mixed, as shown in Fig. 3 . The CP will publish the sensing tasks in advance. Then for any MVD, it can participate in the MCS and submit its bid at anytime within T . Once the CP receives the bid, it will immediately determine whether the MVD wins or not. If the MVD wins, the CP will make the working schedule and determine the payment for this MVD. Then the MVD will work for the sensing tasks according to the received working schedule. After all scheduled sensing tasks are done, the CP will make payment to the MVD.
B. SIMPLE ONLINE INCENTIVE MECHANISM
When design online incentive mechanisms, one precondition should be kept in mind: the CP has no knowledge about the upcoming MVDs and isn't able to make predictions about that. In order to satisfy these property requirements discussed in section III, we first propose a simple online incentive mechanism, which is also based on the proportional share allocation rule as shown in algorithm 2. For each new coming v, we first calculates a temporary payment p v for v which is proportional to the marginal contribution of v over all coverage requirements (line (1) 
if l τ is same to l v and y τ,t v == 0 then 6:
end if 8: end for 9: end if As shown in theorem 4, the simple auction mechanism presented in algorithm 2 satisfies all the desired auction mechanism properties proposed in section III. [20] . its speed and cost are randomly generated from [25km/h, 60km/h] and [10, 30] , respectively. The total time (T = 2.5h) is divided into 150 time slots. The route of each MVD is a sequence of locations on the map and the time at when the MVD will pass through them is obtained based on its speed. One step further, the starting time of the route is distributed over T .
The total number of tasks covered by winner MVDs in the offline incentive mechanism is shown in Fig. 5 . We observe that more tasks can be done with the increase of either the number of MVDs or the budget, respectively. Secondly, we compare the coverage of sensing tasks in our proposed offline incentive mechanism with the mechanism designed in [14] which hasn't considered the time dimension. The results are shown in Fig. 6 (a) and 6(b), separately. We can see the covered location-time points in Fig. 6(a) is denser than that in Fig. 6(b) by about 20 percent. The result shows that the offline incentive mechanism in our paper gets more sensing tasks done over the space and time dimensions. The reason for the sparse coverage in Fig. 6(b) is the overlapping: a sensing task may be covered by more than one MVD at a specific time slot.
B. EVALUATION OF THE ONLINE CASE
To evaluate the performance of online incentive mechanisms designed in this paper, we take the secretary mechanism as a benchmark which is based on the classical secretary algorithm [32] . That can be summarized as: Secretary mechanism. Let the first k arrived MVDs as set K , reject the MVDs in K , and calculate δ = max The experimental setup of the online case is similar to the offline case. The MVDs are required to submit bids at their starting time. We first compare the number of sensing tasks covered by winner MVDs over time obtained from the two online incentive mechanisms proposed in this paper with the secretary mechanism. The result is shown in Fig. 7 . We can observe that for each online incentive mechanism, its coverage increases with the increase of participating MVDs. Then, the results of the secretary mechanism and the Simple-OIM are almost same. However, first k MVDs is rejected in secretary mechanism which can not guarantee sovereignty because these MVDs in K are excluded arbitrarily. The MCS should make each MVD have the same opportunity to win. From this aspect, Simple-OIM is better than the secretary mechanism. (ε, µ)-OIM outperforms the other two mechanisms because it gives the losing MVDs one more chance to win. We know that ε and µ are used to constrain the potential routes. Strict constraints (larger of ε and smaller of µ) will limit number of potential routes and decrease running time. But loose constraints will lead to more tasks covered over time. Thus, (0. 3, 20) -OIM performs better than (0.7, 10)-OIM.
Then we test the performance of the four online incentive mechanisms under different number of sensing tasks. The results of average running time for each MVD under different setups are shown in Fig. 8 . The average running time of each MVD in secretary mechanism and the Simple-OIM turns out to be negligible with the increase of the number of sensing tasks. Because the tweaked DFS is adopted to calculate the potential routes for each losing MVD, the time complexity is high in (ε, µ)-OIM. So (0. 3, 20) -OIM needs more time than (0.7, 10)-OIM. In order to guarantee the computational efficiency, the (ε, µ)-OIM should choose larger ε and smaller µ even though the part of effectiveness will be sacrificed.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we focus on incentive mechanisms design in IoT-based MCSs for surveillance applications. We investigate practical requirements and the importance of fairness and unconsciousness in winner MVDs selection. Two kinds of incentive mechanisms are proposed which can be applied in realistic applications. Extensive simulations are conducted to validate the performance of them.
